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INTRODUCTION 
Professors Lawrence Baum and Stephen Legomsky have 
documented the shortcomings of the nation’s immigration 
adjudication system as revealed in popular and academic articles, 
government and interest group reports, pleas by immigration judges, 
exasperated criticisms by federal appellate judges, and their own 
examination of original data and other sources. 
The resource-starved U.S. immigration removal adjudication 
system’s sometimes shabby and uneven treatment of immigrants 
sends to foreign countries some individuals who are convinced that 
they received a level of justice that was no better than they would 
have received from autocratic bureaucracies in their home countries. 
The system permits others to stay here despite dubious claims to that 
right. 
Removal adjudication is part of the slot machine that is U.S. 
immigration enforcement, which abides the unauthorized presence of 
ten to twelve million individuals, while scooping up a fraction of them 
for criminal prosecution or removal proceedings. Those targeted for 
removal include some who have committed serious crimes but also 
plenty who simply had the misfortune of working for employers with 
a high percentage of illegal workers. Judge Jon Newman of the 
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Second Circuit took note of this uneven treatment in recommending 
that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) consider 
permitting a particular immigrant whom an immigration judge had 
ordered removed “to remain here along with the millions of others 
who are not removed despite their lack of a lawful status.”1 
Professor Legomsky proposes a variety of changes to this system, 
including a more independent first-instance judiciary and a 
specialized federal appellate court.2 Professor Baum analyzes how 
specialization affects judging generally and might affect removal 
litigation.3 In so doing, he sheds some valuable light on how the 
Legomsky specialized appellate court might operate compared to 
alternative proposals for restructuring removal adjudication appeals. 
Both articles are admirable for their analysis, and although chances 
are slim for moving immigration adjudication outside the purview of 
the Department of Justice (DOJ), it is beneficial to churn ideas and 
be ready should an opportunity arise. After explaining my pessimism 
about structural change, I discuss Legomsky’s proposal in Part I, 
drawing on Baum’s insights on specialized courts. Then, in Part II, I 
outline a new (and fairly undeveloped) approach to improving 
immigration court performance without major structural change but 
with a changed DOJ outlook on immigration court oversight and 
management. 
Effecting major legislative changes—such as a restructured 
removal adjudication system—would be a hard slog even with 
substantial legislative majorities in a period of unified government. It 
would be even harder in a divided government or one with small 
legislative majorities under pressure to reduce federal spending. In 
fact, the demand for tougher enforcement of laws on the books could 
lead to pressure, not to make removal adjudication more 
accommodating to aliens, but just the opposite—that is, an Ashcroft 
rather than a Reno mentality. Immigration hard-liners can point to 
reports of disparate asylum adjudication as proof that the 
adjudication system grants asylum to those who do not deserve it. 
Professor Legomsky reasons, correctly I think, that the 2002 changes 
at the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)—a reduction in size and 
 
 1. Rotimi v. Holder, 577 F.3d 133, 139 (2d Cir. 2009) (Newman, J., concurring). 
 2. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 1635 
(2010). 
 3. See Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication of Immigration Cases, 
59 DUKE L.J. 1501 (2010). 
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procedural cuts linked to that reduction—produced more BIA 
decisions unfavorable to immigrants.4 Legislators might decide that 
keeping the immigration courts resource-starved will reduce the 
number of decisions in which immigrants prevail. 
Perhaps the best source of optimism for restructuring and better 
resourcing the adjudication system is a shared concern that it may be 
sending bona fide refugees-in-fact to countries with human rights 
records deplored across the political spectrum. Although most 
removal proceedings completed in 2008 involved Latin Americans, 
only two Latin American countries made the top ten list of 
nationalities receiving asylum in 2008. China heads the list, which 
included some nationalities that barely made or were not even among 
the top twenty-five in completed removal proceedings—aliens from 
Iraq, Albania, Ethiopia, Guinea, and Russia.5 These facts, though, 
have not produced much pressure for major change so far. 
I.  THE LEGOMSKY PROPOSAL: UPGRADE THE ADJUDICATORS, 
TRANSFER AND CONSOLIDATE APPEALS 
Professor Legomsky would move the immigration adjudication 
function from the DOJ to an independent agency within the executive 
branch and convert the immigration judges (IJs) from DOJ attorneys 
to Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) or Article I judges. Although I 
think concern over DOJ manipulation of IJs, although valid, may be 
overwrought, I endorse this proposal while cautioning that an 
independent immigration adjudication agency may have more 
difficulty in securing resources than does the DOJ and its Executive 
Office of Immigration Review (EOIR). 
Professor Legomsky also would replace the BIA and the current 
two-step appellate review process with a new specialized Article III 
appellate court for immigration, staffed on two-year rotations by 
sitting district and circuit judges; Congress would create additional 
district and circuit judgeships sufficient to compensate for those 
assigned temporarily to the new court. Conceptually, this idea has 
some commendable features. Its enactment is highly unlikely, 
however, both because of the difficulty in estimating its caseload and 
the number of judges it would need and because of legislative 
 
 4. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1659. 
 5. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2008 
STATISTICAL YEAR BOOK, at E1 fig.6, E2 tbl.5, J1 fig.15, J2 tbl.7 (2009) [hereinafter EOIR], 
available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/fy08syb.pdf. 
WHEELER IN FINAL 3/30/2010  6:43:40 AM 
1850 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59:1847 
reluctance to create additional judgeships for any purpose. If enacted, 
its implementation would quite likely present a logistical nightmare. 
A. A Separate Executive Branch Agency for First-Instance 
Immigration Removal Adjudication 
Professor Legomsky would convert IJs into Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA)-protected Administrative Law Judges for 
Immigration (ALJIs) and place them in an Office of the Chief 
Administrative Law Judge for Immigration, a separate executive 
branch agency outside of any department. The president would 
appoint the chief judge with Senate confirmation.6 Most sitting IJs 
would be grandfathered in. A merit selection committee, rather than 
the chief judge, would appoint new judges. Legomsky’s proposal 
would also correct various procedural problems that bedevil the 
current system. I see many advantages to this proposal and only one 
potential downside. 
IJs, as Professor Baum explains, have an especially difficult job 
because of their working conditions, the kind of evidence before 
them, and because their decisions, some literally involving life or 
death, are largely dichotomous and final.7 As Professor Legomsky 
shows, they also face a serious case of role conflict. On the one hand, 
they are appointed and subject to removal by a DOJ that describes 
them as “attorneys appointed by the Attorney General to act as the 
Attorney General’s delegates in the cases that come before them.”8 
The DOJ, through the EOIR, exercises general oversight—including 
setting case disposition time frames and conducting performance 
reviews—creating at least the implied threat of retribution or removal 
for judges whose performance runs contrary to DOJ preferences. IJs 
have documented instances in which DOJ supervisors have impinged 
on the independent exercise of their responsibilities, such as the 
DOJ’s failure to implement the authority Congress granted them to 
impose contempt citations9 and a proposed Code of Conduct that 
authorizes BIA members and IJs to discuss cases ex parte with 
government lawyers but not immigrants or their lawyers.10 The 
 
 6. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1714. 
 7. Baum, supra note 3, at 1510–11. 
 8. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2009). 
 9. Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I 
Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 3, 10 (2008). 
 10. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1674–75. 
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attorney general proposed a performance evaluation system in 2006 
over the objections of IJs, who pointed to the APA’s limits on agency 
evaluations for the judges appointed under its aegis.11 Housing a corps 
of judges charged with protecting the rights of an unpopular minority 
in an executive branch law enforcement agency creates, according to 
the National Association of Immigration Law Judges, 
“understandable concerns that the decisions rendered by Immigration 
Judges are not independent and free from pressure or 
manipulation.”12 
On the other hand, the possibility of retribution against IJs is 
apparently much stronger than the reality. The same DOJ that calls 
IJs the attorney general’s delegates also tells them to “exercise their 
independent judgment and discretion” and “take any action 
consistent with their authorities under the Act and the regulations as 
is appropriate and necessary for the disposition of the case.”13 As 
Professor Legomsky acknowledges, DOJ efforts to influence specific 
BIA or IJ decisions are “rare.”14 Moreover, IJs have not been subject 
to the ideological housecleaning that hit the BIA in 2002.15 Legomsky 
is likely correct that the 2002 incident keeps IJs aware that someone 
may be looking over their shoulders as well, but, as Professor Baum 
notes,16 if IJs acted based on pervasive fear of intrusions upon their 
decisionmaking autonomy, one would expect uniform decisions 
reflecting agency priorities, not the major disparities in asylum 
 
 11. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 9, at 14 (“[I]t is a . . . long-established principle that 
administrative law judges must be exempt from . . . agency administered performance 
evaluations . . . to ensure their independence in decision-making. Despite this well-established 
benchmark in administrative adjudications, the first item on the Attorney General’s 22-point 
plan is to subject Immigration Judges to . . . performance evaluations.” (footnote omitted)); see 
also 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2) (2006) (stating that an agency adjudicator “may not be responsible to 
or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged in the performance 
of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency”); VANESSA K. BURROWS, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: AN OVERVIEW 8 (2008) (noting that 
section 554(d) of the APA expressly prohibits the supervision of ALJs by agency employees 
who perform investigative or prosecutorial functions). 
 12. Marks, supra note 9, at 4. 
 13. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(ii). 
 14. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1667. 
 15. Id. at 1670; see also Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 
91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 375–77 (2006) (recounting that the attorney general’s reduction of 
BIA positions in 2002 fell most heavily upon BIA members most sympathetic to immigrant 
claims). 
 16. Baum, supra note 3, at 1529–31. 
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decisions documented by the Government Accountability Office,17 
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC),18 and 
Professor Jaya Ramji-Nogales and her colleagues.19 
Moreover, an informed public expects immigration courts to 
function as impartial courts. Perhaps the most notable thing about 
Monica Goodling and Kyle Sampson’s illegally hiring IJs20 was the 
widespread hostile reaction it engendered and the correction that the 
DOJ quickly put into place.21 And the DOJ report on the incident 
shows that Goodling and Sampson’s goal was not to influence 
immigration removal adjudication but rather to find jobs for 
conservative party loyalists.22 Still, even if Goodling and Sampson did 
not know what IJs do, evidence suggests that their appointees have 
ruled against asylum seekers more than other judges on their courts.23 
In short, the role conflict created by the current arrangement and 
the possibility that some future administration could unleash its own 
Goodlings and Sampsons to meddle in the courts make a strong case 
for statutorily removing the IJs from DOJ management and 
oversight. Professor Legomsky wisely recommends APA protection 
 
 17. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-08-940, U.S. ASYLUM SYSTEM: 
SIGNIFICANT VARIATION EXISTED IN ASYLUM OUTCOMES ACROSS IMMIGRATION COURTS 
AND JUDGES 7–8 (2008) (reporting a considerable variation in asylum decisions across 
immigration courts and judges). 
 18. See, e.g., TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, LATEST DATA FROM 
IMMIGRATION COURTS SHOW DECLINE IN ASYLUM DISPARITY (2009), http://www.trac.syr.edu/ 
immigration/reports/209 (documenting reduced, though still significant, disparities in asylum 
decisions). 
 19. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette, in 
REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR 
REFORM 9, 34–52, 77–86 (2009). Ramji-Nogales and her colleagues initially identified these 
disparities in an earlier version of Refugee Roulette. Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz 
& Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 
328–49 (2007). 
 20. See Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1665–67 (discussing the DOJ’s BIA member and IJ 
hiring practices). 
 21. See id. at 1665 (discussing the DOJ’s response to the politicized hiring allegations). 
 22. See OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY & OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA 
GOODLING AND OTHER STAFF IN THE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 117–18, 121–22 
(2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf (analyzing Goodling and 
Sampson’s conduct in the selection of IJ and BIA candidates). 
 23. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Vetted Judges More Likely to Reject Asylum Bids, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 24, 2008, at A17 (describing an analysis of DOJ data that showed several of the politically 
selected judges to be among the least likely IJs to grant asylum). 
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rather than renewable terms, which would be the likely arrangement 
were IJs placed in an Article I court.24 
I see one drawback, however, to an immigration trial bench in a 
freestanding executive branch agency. It relates to funding. Lack of 
resources understandably gets first billing in Professor 
Legomsky’s25—and almost everyone else’s—catalog of immigration 
court problems. Current funding provides insufficient staff support 
services and allows too few IJs for the number of cases, causing a 
distressingly high caseload per judge. In 2008, IJs averaged more than 
1,500 receipts, including about 1,300 proceedings, with considerable 
variation—proceedings per judge varied from 337 to 3,504.26 
The ultimate source of funds for EOIR, of course, is Congress, 
not the DOJ. The DOJ requests and administers the funds Congress 
provides, generally within the limits Congress specifies. IJs have been 
relentless in criticizing the DOJ, for example, for “fiscal cutbacks to 
critical immigration court resources, including training programs,”27 
and “EOIR’s failure to provide the resources necessary for timely 
adjudications.”28 But moving immigration courts out of the DOJ, 
while sparing them what Professor Legomsky calls “the Justice 
Department’s budgetary and logistical pressures,”29 would subject 
them to the Darwinian process by which agencies compete for 
funding. First, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) trims 
agency funding requests for inclusion in the president’s executive-
branch–wide appropriations request. Once the president submits that 
request to Congress, agencies compete for funds with other agencies, 
under the jurisdiction of whatever appropriations subcommittees to 
which the House and Senate leadership has assigned them. Some 
freestanding executive branch adjudicative bodies have apparently 
 
 24. See Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1679 (“[T]hough Article I judges might enjoy greater 
job security than immigration judges currently do, they might actually have less job security 
than they would under an ALJ model.”). 
 25. Id. at 1651–57. 
 26. These calculations, Russell R. Wheeler, IJ Receipt Data (Jan. 13, 2010) (unpublished 
spreadsheet, on file with the Duke Law Journal), are based on the 224 judges listed on the 
EOIR website and receipt and other data reported in the EOIR 2008 Statistical Year Book. See 
EOIR, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, EOIR Immigration Court Listing, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/ 
sibpages/ICadr.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2010) (listing all IJs); EOIR, supra note 5, at B2 fig.1, 
B7 figs.2 & 3 (listing total immigration court receipts and total immigration court proceedings). 
 27. Letter from Dana Leigh Marks, President, Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges, to 
Senator Edward Kennedy (Mar. 26, 2008) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 28. Marks, supra note 9, at 13. 
 29. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1686. 
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done fairly well in the appropriations process, no doubt in part 
because they have politically sympathetic clienteles, such as veterans, 
or politically popular missions, such as uniform application of the tax 
laws. Query, though, the fate of a freestanding body devoted solely to 
immigrant removal litigation, especially to the extent that the 
appropriators perceive its clientele as undocumented aliens whom the 
government wants out of the country. 
As uncomfortable as IJs may be under the DOJ’s budgetary 
umbrella, that situation—at least with a DOJ committed to ensuring 
their effective operation—may be preferable to swimming alone, first 
in OMB’s budget-hawk review, and then in a hostile congressional 
environment. By analogy, in 1993, federal defenders, who chafe at 
being under the budgetary umbrella of the federal judges on the 
Judicial Conference of the United States, proposed the 
“establish[ment] within the judicial branch [but independent of the 
Conference] of a Center for Federal Criminal Defender Services.”30 
The Judicial Conference rejected the proposal,31 reasoning, 
“[n]otwithstanding the importance of the Sixth Amendment 
and . . . programs [to implement it for indigent federal offenders], the 
fact of the matter is that these programs are unpopular and have no 
‘constituency,’ no power base, and no better champion than the 
judiciary.”32 That statement describes immigration courts, except that 
they have no champion other than proimmigrant lobbying groups that 
have had little effect in getting EOIR the resources it needs. 
B. A New Article III Court for Immigration Appeals 
Professor Legomsky would also eliminate the current two-stage 
appellate process by abolishing the BIA and vesting sole appellate 
jurisdiction in a new U.S. Court of Appeals for Immigration (CAI) 
comprising sitting district judges, and perhaps some circuit judges, 
assigned to the court full-time for a period of two to three years. The 
proposal, however, presents some serious practical problems that 
would make enactment and, in the event of enactment, 
 
 30. COMM. ON DEFENDER SERVS., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE 
COMMITTEE ON DEFENDER SERVICES TO THE INTERIM REPORT OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
ACT REVIEW COMMITTEE 14, 15 (1993) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 31. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 24 (1993), available at http://www.uscourts. 
gov/judconf/93-Mar.pdf. 
 32. COMM. ON DEFENDER SERVS., supra note 30, at 15. 
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implementation, very difficult. These practical, devil-in-the-details 
problems show the difficulty of crafting a coherent structure for 
immigration adjudication, especially in an era of polarized politics. 
Professor Legomsky’s CAI presents several advantages. It would 
likely shorten appellate review of removal orders by eliminating one 
of the two steps currently available. It would also import needed 
values into removal adjudication appellate review (keeping in mind 
Professor Baum’s caution that other specialized courts have not 
always lived up to their creators’ expectations33). It would provide 
more independent decisionmakers. It would provide both a generalist 
and specialized perspective, given the Article III experience 
requirements and the relatively short CAI term of service.34 Interest 
groups could shape the CAI’s decisions by influencing the selection of 
its judges only if they made views on immigration law and policy part 
of the nomination and confirmation process for all district and circuit 
judge vacancies.35 Baum also notes, though, that concentrating 
appeals in a specialized court can affect the perspectives of its 
judges,36 which is perhaps a special consideration for the CAI, given 
that almost all of its members would be district judges with no 
experience with removal adjudication. The CAI’s jurisdiction would 
embrace that currently exercised by the BIA, allowing the CAI to 
hear appeals now walled off from regional appellate court review.37 
1. Estimating the Number of CAI Judgeships Needed.  The first 
problem facing the creators of the CAI would be figuring out how 
many judges it would need to function. Estimating the number of 
appeals that would reach it—and how many of those appeals could be 
terminated procedurally—would be hard. Moreover, the Judicial 
Conference’s method for estimating the number of circuit judges 
necessary for a given caseload is rudimentary at best. 
Professor Legomsky’s draft bill would direct the Judicial 
Conference to recommend to Congress the number of judges for the 
 
 33. See Baum, supra note 3, at 1542 & n.197 (offering the example that executive branch 
officials often staff specialized courts based on patronage considerations, rather than policy 
interests). 
 34. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1692–93. 
 35. See Baum, supra note 3, at 1529 (noting that judicial decisionmaking is more effectively 
influenced through ex ante selection than through ex post mechanisms). 
 36. See id. at 1535 (explaining that concentration of a type of case is likely to produce 
increased uniformity in legal interpretation and greater susceptibility to external influence). 
 37. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1663. 
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CAI and would require each circuit council to select life-tenured 
judges within the circuit to serve on it for a two-year period. The 
judges would be drawn from each circuit in proportion to the 
percentage that each circuit’s judges comprise all district and circuit 
judges nationally.38 The Conference would also recommend how 
many additional district and circuit judgeships Congress should create 
to compensate the courts for the judges serving temporarily on the 
CAI, factoring into its calculation the reduced court of appeals 
caseload due to the elimination of BIA appeals.39 
Predicting with much precision the number of judges needed to 
staff the CAI would be no easy task. For the rough calculations that 
follow, I draw data from 2008, 2009, and 2010 sources, as available. I 
also use, when possible, data that give the benefit of the doubt to 
Professor Legomsky’s proposal. 
Estimating the likely caseload of the CAI starts with the 30,435 
appeals of IJ decisions and 1,997 appeals of DHS decisions that the 
BIA received in 2008.40 Professor Legomsky notes various factors that 
could affect whether the CAI could expect similar filing levels, such 
as national economic upturns or downturns.41 Decisions of a national 
corps of properly resourced ALJIs might command more respect than 
do current IJ decisions and thus might decrease appeals.42 Conversely, 
though, a CAI perceived as more competent than the BIA might 
cause an alien to rethink the cost-benefit calculus for taking an 
appeal. An alien unwilling to bear the costs of a stopover at the BIA 
and a further appeal to a regional appellate court might be willing to 
spend the money for a one-shot appeal to the CAI. And incipient 
efforts to promote more and better representation—pro bono and 
otherwise43—could increase the appeal rate. 
 
 38. Id. at 1715. 
 39. Id. at 1714–15. 
 40. EOIR, supra note 5, at S2. 
 41. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1698–99. 
 42. Id. at 1700. 
 43. See, e.g., Robert A. Katzmann, Deepening the Legal Profession’s Pro Bono 
Commitment to the Immigrant Poor, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 453–59 (2009) (discussing 
efforts to increase and improve representation of immigrants in New York City). For the 
reports of three task forces that Judge Katzmann has assembled to enhance pro bono and paid 
representation of aliens in immigration adjudication in New York City, see Jennifer L. Colyer et 
al., The Representational and Counseling Needs of the Immigrant Poor, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 
461 (2009); Claudia Slovinsky, Introduction, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 515 (2009); Jojo Annobil, The 
Immigration Representation Project: Meeting the Critical Needs of Low-Wage and Indigent New 
Yorkers Facing Removal, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 517 (2009); Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to 
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Thus, without more definitive information, the BIA’s 32,432 
cases in 2008 can serve as a tenuous predictor of the CAI’s caseload. 
The CAI would probably terminate more than half of those cases 
procedurally. In 2008, 48 percent of the courts of appeals’ 
terminations were procedural.44 Appellate staff disposed of over 
15,000 of the 27,161 procedural terminations with no judicial 
involvement. Judge time spent on the roughly 12,000 other 
procedural terminations was considerably less than that devoted to 
the 29,608 merits terminations.45 The rate of procedural terminations 
for administrative appeals, almost all of which are BIA appeals,46 was 
about the same for all types of cases. Available data do not indicate 
whether, within the category of administrative appeals, BIA appeals 
had higher rates of procedural terminations than did appeals from 
other agencies. 
The proportion of staff-dominated procedural terminations 
would probably go up in a CAI that received the total BIA caseload, 
because it is quite likely that many cases that would have been 
terminated procedurally never made it from the BIA to the courts of 
appeals. Also, the CAI caseload would not include as many time-
consuming cases as are on the dockets of the regional courts of 
appeals. On the other hand, those dockets have substantial numbers 
of what are, to use Professor Baum’s term, “easy cases.”47 Of the 
29,608 court of appeals merits terminations in 2008, almost a quarter 
were either prisoner cases or mostly undemanding original 
 
Representation for Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, A 
Case Study, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541 (2009); Careen Shannon, Regulating Immigrant Legal 
Service Providers: Inadequate Representation and Notario Fraud, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 577 
(2009). Other pro bono representation projects are active around the country. For example, 
there are projects in Houston, see ABA, South Texas Pro Bono Asylum Representation Project 
(ProBAR), http://www.abanet.org/publicserv/immigration/probar.shtml (last visited Mar. 20, 
2010); San Diego, see ABA, Immigration Justice Project of San Diego, http://new.abanet.org/ 
Immigration/Pages/ImmigrationJusticeProject.aspx (last visited Mar. 20, 2010); and Florida, see 
Fla. Immigrant Advocacy Ctr., Mission Statement, http://www.fiacfla.org/mission.php (last 
visited Mar. 20, 2010). 
 44. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS: 2008 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 84 tbl.B-1 (2008), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf (showing that 2,327 cases 
were disposed of by consolidation and that a handful of procedural terminations involved cross 
appeals). 
 45. See id. at 115 tbl.B-5A. 
 46. See id. at 84 tbl.B-1, 96 tbl.B-3. 
 47. See Baum, supra note 3, at 1508 (characterizing easy cases as those with “one obvious 
outcome under the law”). 
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proceedings.48 And not all immigration cases are easy cases; this is 
especially true of asylum cases, which require appellate judges to 
determine whether substantial evidence supports IJ decisions about 
witness credibility. 
With all of these imponderables, a CAI in 2010 would—based on 
conservative estimates—terminate about ten thousand cases on the 
merits and twenty thousand procedurally, with most of these 
procedural terminations requiring little, if any, judge time. For the 
analysis that follows, I consider only the roughly estimated ten 
thousand merits terminations per year. How many judges would the 
CAI need to handle those cases, and thus how many new judgeships 
should Congress create to compensate the district and appellate 
courts for loaning their judges to the new court? Were Congress 
serious about creating a one-step immigration appellate process and 
assigning it to a single Article III court, Congress would probably 
expect that court to handle its cases in pretty much the same fashion 
that the regional appellate courts handle their cases—through three-
judge panels. (I recognize, though, Professor Baum’s point that 
Congress might prescribe rules and procedures to favor the 
government.49) The BIA in 2009 disposed of 94 percent of its cases 
through one-member, usually very short, decisions,50 and Professor 
Legomsky documents the problems this arrangement creates.51 
Appellate review in an Article III court is a different animal than in 
the BIA—the courts of appeals in 2008 averaged 340 terminations per 
judgeship nationwide52 versus a BIA member’s 2,500 per year.53 And, 
although the BIA heard oral argument in only one case in 2009,54 the 
courts of appeals, based on admittedly limited data, probably give 
 
 48. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 44, at 84 tbl.B-1. Original 
proceedings are principally petitions for various writs that originate in the courts of appeals and 
petitions to file second or successive habeas corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). 
 49. See Baum, supra note 3, at 1560 (describing specialized courts’ substantive and 
procedural rules as a mechanism of ex ante congressional control). 
 50. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1657. 
 51. See id. at 1664–65 (explaining that single-member decisions increase the probability of 
errors, subjective biases, and inconsistency). 
 52. This figure is calculated based on data in ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra 
note 44, at 84 tbl.B-1. 
 53. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1654. 
 54. Id. at 1707. 
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oral argument to somewhere between 10 and 20 percent of BIA 
appeals,55 versus 30 percent across the entire caseload.56 
How many judges would the CAI need to give adequate 
attention to ten thousand merits panel cases from the immigration 
courts? The starting point is to determine the number of regional 
appellate court judges who terminated 29,608 merits panel cases in 
2008.57 It is difficult, though, to pin down that number. There are 
always vacancies in the regional appellate courts’ 167 statutorily 
authorized judgeships (an unusually high eighteen in mid-March 
201058). And although senior judges in 2009 participated in 17.8 
percent of all oral arguments and submissions of briefs,59 and 
seventeen active circuit and 186 active district judges sat temporarily 
in the courts of appeals in 2008,60 there is no published figure as to the 
number of “full-time–equivalent” judges these judges represent. 
Furthermore, although the Judicial Conference has a fairly 
sophisticated system in place to weigh the judicial demands presented 
by different types of district cases, it does not have a reliable method 
of weighting appellate cases according to the judge time they 
demand.61 If it had such a system for appellate cases, the Conference 
 
 55. A Second Circuit judge estimated that between 15 and 20 percent of BIA appeals 
receive oral argument. Robert A. Katzmann, J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
Remarks at the Brookings Institution’s Judicial Issues Forum: Immigration and the Courts 56 
(Feb. 20, 2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/events/2009/0220_ 
immigration/20080220_immigration.pdf. One Ninth Circuit judge said there is oral argument in 
“less than 20%” of BIA appeals, Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 182 (2006) (letter of Sidney R. Thomas, J., U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit), available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/ 
109hrg/28339.pdf, and another said approximately 10 percent “proceeded to merits panels of 
three judges” in 2005, id. at 51 (statement of Carlos T. Bea, J., U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit). 
 56. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 44, at 84 tbl.B-1 (citing 8,983 
cases terminated after oral hearing, out of 29,608 total cases terminated on the merits). 
 57. Id. 
 58. U.S. Courts, Judicial Vacancies, http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialvac.cfm (last visited 
Mar. 20, 2010). 
 59. U.S. Courts, Work of Senior Judges Provides Much Help, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
newsroom/2010/SeniorJudges.cfm (last visited Mar. 20, 2010). 
 60. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 44, at 404 tbl.V-2. 
 61. See PATRICIA LOMBARD & CAROL KRAFKA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., 2003-2004 
DISTRICT COURT CASE-WEIGHTING STUDY: FINAL REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
JUDICIAL STATISTICS OF THE COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL RESOURCES OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 9–21 (2005) (discussing the goals and limitations of a 
method for calculating district case weights to replace the outdated set then in use). But see 
WILLIAM O. JENKINS, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-09-1050T, FEDERAL 
JUDGESHIPS: THE GENERAL ACCURACY OF DISTRICT AND APPELLATE JUDGESHIP CASE-
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could apply the weights assigned to BIA appeals to the BIA’s roughly 
thirty thousand IJ appeals to obtain at least a rough estimate of the 
number of judges needed for the CAI. The current 167 court of 
appeals judgeships are a product of rough statistical estimates (“a 
standard of 500 filings . . . per panel and with pro se appeals weighted 
as one third of a case”62) as applied in 1990 (the most recent year 
Congress created new appellate judgeships) along with a variety of 
other factors, including the refusal of some appellate courts to request 
additional judgeships that their increased caseloads would justify. 
Given the lack of empirical guidance, a tenuous assumption is 
that forty judges would be needed to handle the ten thousand or so 
merits panel cases that would come to the CAI from the immigration 
courts. This is a conservative estimate, which allows 250 merits 
terminations per CAI judgeship, compared to 172 per judgeship in 
the regional courts of appeals in 2008, and does not include any judge 
time for procedural terminations. Assume as well that the Conference 
would ask Congress to create forty additional judgeships to replace 
the judges assigned to the CAI. (Professor Legomsky would tell the 
Conference to factor in the appellate work reduction from the 
absence of BIA appeals; however, for reasons explained below, that 
would be difficult to do from a practical standpoint.) 
2. Enacting the Judgeship Legislation.  Congress has not enacted 
an omnibus (that is, judiciary-wide) judgeship bill since 1990,63 
although it has created a handful of district judgeships, principally in 
the districts along the border with Mexico.64 Repeated attempts to 
enact an omnibus bill have failed, and prospects are not great for the 
 
RELATED WORKLOAD MEASURES 3–4 (2009) (arguing that the methodology used to estimate 
judicial case weights was inadequate). 
 62. Federal Judgeship Act of 2008: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th 
Cong. 427 (2008) (statement of George Z. Singal, C.J., U.S. District Court for the District of 
Maine). 
 63. See Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plans, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 
5089 (1990) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). 
 64. E.g., 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. 
No. 107-273, § 312, 116 Stat. 1758, 1786–88 (2002) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 133 
(2006)) (adding additional permanent district judgeships for, among other districts, the Western 
District of Texas, as well as additional temporary district judgeships for, among other districts, 
the District of Arizona, the District of New Mexico, and the Eastern District of Texas); Federal 
Funding, Fiscal Year 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-553, § 305, 114 Stat. 2762, 2762A-84 to -85 (2000) 
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 133 (2006)) (adding additional district judgeships for, 
among other districts, the District of Arizona, the District of New Mexico, and the Western 
District of Texas). 
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omnibus judgeship bill introduced in the 111th Congress, which 
embodies the Judicial Conference’s request for sixty-nine new 
judgeships—twelve circuit and fifty-seven district judgeships.65 
Prospects for enactment of the CAI would be hindered by three 
factors: costs, the polarized politics of judicial selection, and 
resistance from federal judges. 
a. Costs of the Judgeships.  Congress generally requires that most 
direct spending increases be offset by revenue increases or reductions 
in other spending—“PAYGO” in shorthand.66 Professor Legomsky 
asserts that his proposal would generate savings from four sources: 
(1) the economy that would result, on a case-by-case basis, from 
review in the CAI as opposed to the BIA, based on lower salaries of 
federal court clerks and staff attorneys compared to BIA staff 
attorneys; (2) savings to the judicial branch from the elimination of 
BIA appeals in the regional courts of appeals; (3) savings to the DOJ 
for the same reason; and (4) reduced DHS costs of detaining aliens 
due to a reduction in elapsed time from removal order to appellate 
determination.67 He argues that although his cost analysis is crude, 
“the proposal would substantially reduce the total fiscal cost of 
appellate review of removal orders.”68 With deference, most of these 
cost savings are illusory, because the question is not whether the 
proposal would reduce the cost of appellate review of removal orders 
but rather whether the proposal would reduce overall spending by the 
agencies currently involved in BIA and regional appellate review of 
removal orders. Except for reduced detention costs, I see no 
appreciable savings. 
First, the costs of operating a forty-judge CAI would, based on 
my estimates, be about the same as operating the BIA. As Professor 
Legomsky notes, the EOIR cannot specify how much of its roughly 
three-hundred-million-dollar budget goes to the BIA. Given this 
somewhat surprising fact, the next-best option is an estimate based on 
information that the DOJ has published and information that the 
EOIR has released. Legomsky makes a convincing case that the costs 
to maintain a BIA member are higher than those to maintain a 
 
 65. See Federal Judgeship Act of 2009, S. 1653, 111th Cong. (2009); Federal Judgeship Act 
of 2009, H.R. 3662, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 66. For the most recent enactment, see Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-139, tit. I, 124 Stat. 8 (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.). 
 67. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1696–1703. 
 68. Id. at 1702. 
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district or circuit judge, because the principal-to-staff ratio is much 
greater for the BIA than for circuit or district judges, and BIA staff 
attorneys earn considerably more than Article III judges’ chambers 
clerks and the courts’ staff attorneys.69 But that fact appears to lose 
relevance given even my conservative estimate of a forty-judge CAI. 
I developed cost estimates using the salary and personnel data 
that the EOIR provided to Professor Legomsky,70 fiscal and personnel 
data posted on the DOJ website, and assumptions about staffing 
levels within the components of the EOIR and those units’ 
comparative expenditures on travel and contractors.71 My estimates of 
the costs are: the BIA, about $96 million; the immigration courts, 
about $119 million; the chief administrative hearing officer (a small 
cadre of APA ALJs within the EOIR), about $8 million; and the 
director and other management units within the EOIR, about $78 
million.72 
Then, using data provided by the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts on the estimated annual recurring cost of maintaining a 
district or circuit judge, including salaries and benefits of judges and 
their chambers staff, and the operating costs for the chambers,73 along 
with additional personnel and cost data in the Administrative Office’s 
“Fiscal Year 2011 Congressional Budget Justification,”74 I estimated 
 
 69. Id. at 1696–98. 
 70. Id. at 1652 n.73. 
 71. The Justice Department data I used are available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2011 
justification/, under the heading Administrative Review and Appeals, which embraces EOIR 
and the Office of the Pardon Attorney. The pardon attorney budget, however, is so small—
around two million dollars of a roughly three-hundred-million-dollar budget—as to have no 
discernable impact on my estimates, and I eliminated pardon attorney costs whenever they were 
specified. The Word document (“fy11-ara justification.doc”) provides some structural 
information. The Excel spreadsheet (“fy11-ara justification-exhibits.xls”) provides, at Exhibit I, 
“Detail of Permanent Positions by Category,” information on the number of attorneys, 
paralegals, and other employees within the EOIR. Exhibit L, “Summary of Requirements by 
Object Class,” identifies how much the EOIR planned to spend in 2010 in various expense 
categories, such as rent payments to the General Services Administration, “[o]ther services” 
(that is, contractors, such as, I assume, translators), and equipment maintenance. 
 72. My Excel spreadsheets with these cost estimates are on file with the Duke Law Journal. 
Russell R. Wheeler, EOIR CAI Budget Estimate (Jan. 13, 2010) (unpublished spreadsheet, on 
file with the Duke Law Journal). Thanks to Norman Baker of the Federal Judicial Center for 
calling my attention to sources used in these cost estimates. 
 73. Telephone Interview with Penny Fleming, Chief, Financial Liaison & Analysis Office, 
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (Jan. 14, 2010). To be precise, the estimates are $980,000 for a 
circuit judgeship and $981,000 for a district judgeship. 
 74. This document, on file with the Duke Law Journal, presents backup information to 
support the judicial branch’s annual appropriations request. I used information at page 10 of the 
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the cost of a forty-judge U.S. appellate court, with a full complement 
of chambers law clerks and staff attorneys, to be about $105 million. 
Because judges on a court doing only immigration appeals might not 
need a full complement of law clerks and staff attorneys, I reduced 
the number of these staff members, for a revised estimate of about 
$92 million. 
Professor Legomsky’s second and third sources of asserted cost 
savings come from eliminating the current round of BIA appeals in 
the regional appellate courts. It is true that under his proposal the 
judicial branch would no longer dispose of ten thousand or so annual 
BIA appeals, and the DOJ would no longer litigate them, but it 
hardly follows that spending by the judicial branch or the DOJ would 
decrease proportionately. Just as the courts of appeals have adjusted 
their procedures to handle the increase in BIA and other appeals with 
no corresponding increase in judgeships, they would use the judge 
and staff time previously devoted to BIA appeals to handle increased 
filings in other areas, and, perhaps, to ratchet back somewhat the use 
of truncated procedures—perhaps by granting oral argument or 
writing published opinions in a few more cases than they otherwise 
could. Likewise, were BIA appeals to go away, the DOJ would not 
fire the attorneys who litigated those appeals but rather would deploy 
them to other litigation, including perhaps an appellate process in the 
CAI that might be more demanding of lawyers than that of the BIA. 
The only tangible savings from adoption of Professor 
Legomsky’s proposal arise from the reduction in the amount of time 
aliens in removal proceedings would spend in detention due to the 
likely decrease in elapsed time from IJ order to appellate disposition. 
I cannot say, though, as Legomsky does, that those savings would be 
“significant,” however that is defined. 
b. Polarized Judicial Appointment Politics.  The politics of 
judicial appointments creates another impediment to the creation of 
the CAI. The judgeship bills now before Congress have no 
Republican cosponsors because the judgeships would be in place 
upon enactment for President Obama to try to fill. In 2007, a similar 
bill had bipartisan support, in part because it provided that the 
judgeships would not be effective until January 20, 2009. Bipartisan 
 
“Summary” (“Comparative Summary of Obligations by Object Classification”), and at page 5.9 
(“Summary of Personal Compensation and Benefits by Activity”). 
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support, though, did not produce a judgeship bill for President Bush 
to sign. 
Creating forty judgeships—even if only to provide the district 
and appellate courts with sufficient numbers to stock the CAI—
would nevertheless allow the current president to change the overall 
makeup of the judiciary as represented by the party of the appointing 
president. And, if the immigration court caseload were to decline, the 
size of the CAI could be reduced, moving more of these appointees 
back to the circuit and district courts. Moreover, although Professor 
Legomsky assumes that “each circuit would contribute district and 
circuit judges proportionately to the total number of district and 
circuit judges in that circuit,”75 his draft bill does not require the 
appointment of circuit judges to the new court. It simply requires the 
assignment of “the number of judges that is proportional to the total 
number of authorized article III circuit and district judgeships in such 
circuit.”76 Quite likely there would be pressure in the judicial councils 
(all of which have a one-circuit-judge majority)77 to draw judges 
exclusively from the district courts, on the view that the court of 
appeals needs additional judgeships more than some of the circuit’s 
less-busy district courts. And, given that the additional circuit judges 
might not be assigned to the new court, the party out of power will 
resist the bill because it would change the party-of-appointing-
president composition of the courts of appeals. 
c. Resistance from Federal Judges.  Professor Legomsky’s 
proposal would have to overcome stiff resistance from the judicial 
branch itself. First, its passage would likely doom any chance that 
Congress would also enact the long-overdue omnibus judgeship bill, 
which already faces stiff headwinds. If the president and his 
supporters could persuade Congress to give the president or his 
successor forty more judgeships to fill, it is highly unlikely that they 
could persuade Congress to create still another large group of 
judgeships. Congress, remember, has refused to enact an omnibus 
judgeship bill since 1990. Judges might also resist creation of 
 
 75. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1686–87. 
 76. Stephen H. Legomsky, Second Draft of Proposed Bill for Restructuring Immigration 
Adjudication § 3(a) (Jan. 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law 
Journal) (proposing amendments to section 242 of the INA). 
 77. See 28 U.S.C. § 332(a)(1) (2006) (creating judicial councils “consisting of the chief 
judge of the circuit, who shall preside, and an equal number of circuit judges and district 
judges”). 
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additional judgeships to stock the CAI—as opposed to providing 
omnibus judgeship relief that the judges themselves have requested—
because at least some judges believe that doing so would, in Justice 
Frankfurter’s words, “result, by its own Gresham’s law, in a 
depreciation of the judicial currency and the consequent impairment 
of the prestige and of the efficacy of the federal courts.”78 
Second, federal judges would object to the prospect of an 
assignment they did not anticipate when they accepted their judicial 
appointment—a steady diet of immigration cases, the possibility of 
temporary relocation to another city (or travel to the court site 
mainly for relatively rare hearings), lost personal interaction with 
colleagues, and a concern that their generalist judicial skills would 
atrophy during their two-year exile. Professor Legomsky says that 
“some of these disadvantages are minor and . . . others are easily 
remedied.”79 I am not so sure. It is true that few circuit judges reside 
near their court’s headquarters. But, unlike established regional 
appellate court judges, the members of the CAI would probably want 
a lot of personal interaction, especially because they would be almost 
all trial judges in a new role (deciding appeals) in an area of the law 
that would be new and arcane to them. 
Finally, there is no guarantee that Congress, if it created the 
CAI, would indeed provide the circuit and district judgeships 
necessary to compensate for judges assigned to the new court (in part 
because the Judicial Conference lacks the tools to make a solid 
empirical case for its recommendation80). As Professor Baum 
explains,81 Senator Specter’s short-lived 2006 bill to transfer all BIA 
appeals to the Federal Circuit would have provided only three more 
judges for that court, which would have been overwhelmed by the 
caseload. The overall court of appeals caseload would no longer 
include BIA appeals (10,280 in 2008), but that benefit would not be 
felt evenly in all courts—or at all in the district courts. 
 
 78. Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 59 (1955) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
 79. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1706. 
 80. See Responding to the Growing Need for Federal Judgeships: The Federal Judgeship Act 
of 2008: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 90, 92 (2008) (statement of 
William O. Jenkins, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability 
Office) (stating that “there is no empirical bases or [sic] assessing the potential accuracy of 
adjusted case filings as a measure of case-related judge workload”—the measure upon which 
the Judicial Conference based its recommendation). 
 81. See Baum, supra note 3, at 1557 (discussing Senator Specter’s proposal). 
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3. Implementing the New Court.  Table 1 shows the contribution, 
according to Professor Legomsky’s formula,82 expected from each 
circuit to a forty-judge CAI, in descending order of contribution. For 
example, the Ninth Circuit has 16.39 percent of all circuit and district 
judgeships. Applying this percentage to a forty-judge CAI, the Ninth 
Circuit would have to contribute 6.55 judges. The circuit’s 107 district 
judgeships and twenty-nine circuit judgeships constitute 78.68 and 
21.32 percent, respectively, of the circuit’s 136 total judgeships. So, 
with rounding, the Ninth Circuit would get five new district 
judgeships and one new circuit judgeship. 
The numbers suggest some logistical difficulties facing the 
Judicial Conference and Congress in creating additional judgeships 
and the circuit councils in making assignments to the CAI. 
Table 1.  Judgeship Allocations to the Circuits to Support a Forty-
Judge CAI 
A B C D E F G H I J 
Circuit DJs CJs Total % DJs % CJs % all Js All Js DJs CJs 
9 107 29 136 78.68% 21.32% 16.39% 6.55 5.16 1.40 
5 82 17 99 82.83% 17.17% 11.93% 4.77 3.95 0.82 
11 67 12 79 84.81% 15.19% 9.52% 3.81 3.23 0.58 
6 62 16 78 79.49% 20.51% 9.40% 3.76 2.99 0.77 
2 62 13 75 82.67% 17.33% 9.04% 3.61 2.99 0.63 
3 59 14 73 80.82% 19.18% 8.80% 3.52 2.84 0.67 
4 55 15 70 78.57% 21.43% 8.43% 3.37 2.65 0.72 
7 47 11 58 81.03% 18.97% 6.99% 2.80 2.27 0.53 
8 41 11 52 78.85% 21.15% 6.27% 2.51 1.98 0.53 
10 37 12 49 75.51% 24.49% 5.90% 2.36 1.78 0.58 
1 29 6 35 82.86% 17.14% 4.22% 1.69 1.40 0.29 
DC 15 11 26 57.69% 42.31% 3.13% 1.25 0.72 0.53 
  663 167 830 79.88% 20.12% 100.00% 40.00 31.95 8.05 
Professor Legomsky proposes that the Conference, in 
recommending the number of judgeships necessary to compensate for 
those assigned to the CAI, reduce that number to reflect the 
elimination of BIA appeals in the regional courts of appeals.83 
Column J shows that the Ninth Circuit would get one additional 
circuit judge (rounding down from 1.4). But how might the 
 
 82. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. 
 83. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1714–15. 
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Conference adjust the smaller fractions produced by the application 
of the formula? 
Second, the bill directs assignments to the new court “in 
accordance with the formula . . . with reasonable adjustments for 
rounding.”84 It would be easy enough to round the number of judges 
that each circuit would contribute to the new court (column H)—
seven from the Ninth Circuit, five from the Fifth, and so on. But 
where would Congress place the compensating judgeships without 
knowing whether the judicial councils would assign any circuit judges 
to the new court or from which districts the councils would select 
judges for CAI assignment? (Every circuit but the District of 
Columbia has more districts than the number of judges it would 
receive, as column H of Table 1 shows.) It is unlikely, given senators’ 
desire to control patronage, that Congress would authorize district 
judgeships for a circuit but let the circuit council determine where to 
assign them. 
For illustration, assume that, as of early 2010, Congress had 
created the CAI along with eight additional circuit judgeships and 
thirty-two additional district judgeships. Assume as well that one of 
the eight circuit judgeships was for the Fourth Circuit. Because the 
Fourth Circuit’s court of appeals has three vacancies (as of mid-
March 2010),85 the circuit council would be unlikely to loan an 
appellate judge to the CAI unless statutorily mandated to do so. 
Thus, the council would have to turn to the district courts to find the 
three judges that the formula demands it contribute to the CAI. But if 
the Fourth Circuit received one circuit judgeship, it could not receive 
all three district judgeships to which its formula-based 2.65 district 
judgeships, when rounded, would entitle it because it is entitled to 
only three additional judgeships overall. 
In a rational world, Congress would assign the Fourth Circuit’s 
two additional district judges to its largest districts—Eastern Virginia 
(currently eleven judgeships) and either Maryland or South Carolina 
(currently ten judgeships each)—on the view that the larger the court, 
the easier it is to part with a judgeship for two years because there are 
more judges to fill in to handle the docket. It is true that, under 
Professor Legomsky’s proposal, the district loaning a judgeship to the 
CAI may have received an additional judgeship to compensate it for 
the loan. But the districts may have other vacancies: Eastern Virginia, 
 
 84. Legomsky, supra note 76, § 3(a). 
 85. U.S. Courts, supra note 58. 
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with twelve judgeships under the hypothetical CAI statute, would 
have an easier time covering its docket, even with one judgeship 
temporarily assigned to the CAI and another vacant (as it has been 
since May 2007), than would a six-judgeship Eastern North Carolina, 
with one of the six loaned to the CAI and another vacant (as it has 
been since December 2005). 
Which districts would actually get the judgeships, however, might 
well turn on which legislators from the Fourth Circuit’s five states are 
best positioned to influence the legislation. Regardless, the circuit 
council would need to find one judge for the CAI from a district that 
did not receive an additional judgeship. 
Moreover, what happens once the judges first assigned to the 
CAI complete their two-year term? Would their districts, or at least 
the two that received the additional judgeships, be obliged to send 
two other judges to the CAI, rather than have the council turn to 
districts that did not receive additional judgeships? If so, would the 
courts that received the additional judgeships become the permanent 
loaner courts for the CAI? What effect would that have on whether 
would-be judges in those districts would seek or accept nominations 
as district judges, knowing that they would likely be tapped for a stint 
on the CAI sometime after three years of service? Furthermore, these 
hypotheticals assume that the president has nominated and the 
Senate has confirmed the additional judges for the new seats created 
to stock the CAI. In today’s climate of polarized judicial 
appointments politics, that assumption is highly risky. 
C. Final Observation 
Professor Legomsky’s proposal brings some much-needed fresh 
thinking to the debate over immigration adjudication reform. He has 
tried to fashion a compromise that would satisfy all—or at least 
most—stakeholders in this debate. But, especially in today’s 
dysfunctional political environment, the whole concept of a CAI 
presents too many cost and logistical obstacles. Converting IJs to 
ALJs in an independent agency might be more likely to be enacted 
than creating the CAI, but doing so might make it harder to obtain 
resources for the ALJIs, and resources, rather than organizational 
placement, are the main barrier to consistently effective IJ 
performance. 
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II.  A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO IMPROVING 
THE IMMIGRATION COURTS 
Immigration courts—for all the ink devoted to them in recent 
years—have been subjected to rather narrow analyses of how they 
function as courts, and there has been little effort to learn how lessons 
gleaned about the ingredients for effective courts might be applied to 
immigration courts. I focus on immigration courts because they are 
where the litigation journey ends for the great majority of individuals 
in removal proceedings.86 
Given barriers to major structural change, perhaps the best hope 
for improvement in immigration adjudication at the first-instance 
level is for a new DOJ approach to immigration court management. 
Expecting this may be as implausible as expecting major structural 
changes—and, as Professor Legomsky explains, a new executive 
branch policy could be ephemeral, good only until the next attorney 
general takes over87—but it is better than not trying anything. And 
this new approach to the immigration courts would also benefit a new 
independent adjudicative agency, in the unlikely event that Congress 
were to establish it. 
In this Part, I suggest that the DOJ and the immigration courts 
look to successful efforts to improve the performance of third branch 
courts—defining performance broadly to include not only expeditious 
case disposition, but also judges’ accountability, transparency, and 
attentiveness to the needs of court users. Performance-enhancing 
efforts include the identification of minimum standards of court 
organization and management, the identification of minimum 
standards of court performance, and efforts to change courts’ 
organizational culture. 
A. Using Third Branch Analytic Methods and Findings to Assess and 
Improve First Branch Courts 
“Immigration Court basically looks, feels, and operates like most 
other courts [even though] some of its characteristics strike even 
 
 86. See EOIR, supra note 5, at Y1 (“Only a relatively small percentage of immigration 
judge decisions are appealed to the BIA.”). 
 87. See Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1677 (“No matter how much trust a given attorney 
general might inspire among subordinates, the genie is now out of the bottle. . . . [A]ny action 
the DOJ takes to restore the adjudicators’ job security can be undone at any time by a successor 
administration or a successor attorney general.”). 
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experienced litigators as foreign.”88 Beyond their look and feel, 
though, are other factors that make immigration courts less like many 
first branch courts and more like third branch courts. The Federal 
Administrative Law Judges Conference Website in January 2010 
reported that there are “over 1,300 Administrative Law Judges 
assigned to 31 Federal agencies.”89 Excluding the Social Security 
Administration’s 1,184 judges, the Labor Department’s fifty judges, 
and the National Labor Relations Board’s sixty judges, agencies 
employ between one and nineteen ALJs.90 A 2002 canvass identified 
3,370 non-APA judges.91 In many, though certainly not all,92 of these 
agencies caseloads tend to be small, although the cases are often 
complex and serious, sometimes lasting for several years. Many of 
these courts are based exclusively in Washington, D.C., or its suburbs. 
In short, unlike most executive branch courts, the immigration 
courts resemble a state trial court system or the U.S. bankruptcy 
courts. Immigration courts are scattered over a large geographic 
jurisdiction and have larger caseloads than most executive branch 
judiciaries. IJs are specialists, as are U.S. bankruptcy judges and, 
Professor Baum notes, many state trial judges.93 Furthermore, like 
third branch adjudication, immigration adjudication concerns not 
simply public welfare benefits, but the fundamental rights of the 
litigants—especially if losing means returning to an authoritarian 
regime to face persecution. 
B. Standards for Assessing Courts 
Efforts to change the structure and operation of third branch 
courts have taken many forms, but the creation and use of minimum 
standards to assess courts has been one of the most pervasive. 
 
 88. Stacy Caplow, ReNorming Immigration Court, 13 NEXUS 85, 87 (2008). 
 89. Fed. Admin. Law Judges Conference, What Is FALJC?, http://005754d.netsolhost.com/ 
faljc1.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2010). Thanks to Governance Institute research fellows Jerry 
Richman and Dominic Nardi for information on administrative judges. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Michael Asimow, The Spreading Umbrella: Extending the APA’s Adjudication 
Provisions to All Evidentiary Hearings Required by Statute, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1003, 1008 
(2004). 
 92. Veterans Law judges averaged 729 cases per judge; Social Security Administration 
ALJs averaged 544 cases per judge. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, ABA, REFORMING THE 
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, at ES-28 (2010), available at http://new.abanet. 
org/Immigration/Documents/ReformingtheImmigrationSystemExecutiveSummary.pdf. 
 93. See Baum, supra note 3, at 1532–36 (examining forms of specialization within the 
judicial branch). 
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Importing into immigration courts standards born outside the 
administrative law context is not necessarily novel. As Professor 
Legomsky has explained elsewhere,94 and Professor Jennifer Chacón 
explains in this Symposium,95 Congress has been reshaping 
immigration adjudication, which is technically civil and 
administrative, using criminal prosecution norms such as an emphasis 
on detention, albeit without adopting parallel procedural norms to 
protect individual rights, such as government-provided counsel for 
indigent aliens. 
The challenge is to identify and apply to immigration courts 
standards and analytical approaches that are more appropriate than 
one-sided criminal enforcement standards. The analysis that follows is 
tentative, limited, and exploratory, and I welcome comments and 
challenges to it. I realize, too, that the current caseload per IJ may 
make a pipe dream of this approach, including application of the 
diagnostics necessary to implement it. 
There are three types of third branch standards: judicial 
administration standards, performance standards, and cultural 
standards. 
1. Judicial Administration Standards.  It seems likely that how 
courts are organized—for example, whether trial courts are 
consolidated or dispersed and where supervisory authority is 
lodged—may have some influence on courts’ ability to deliver justice 
effectively, expeditiously, and economically. “Have some influence,” 
however, does not mean “control entirely.” 
Starting in the 1930s, the American Bar Association (ABA) 
developed “Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration.”96 The 
ABA approved revisions of these standards in 197497 and 1990,98 and 
 
 94. Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation 
of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469 (2007). 
 95. Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention? Immigration Courts and the 
Adjudication of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563 (2010). 
 96. NAT’L CONFERENCE OF JUDICIAL COUNCILS, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL 
ADMINISTRATION: A SURVEY OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE STANDARDS OF THE AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCIATION FOR IMPROVING THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE HAVE BEEN 
ACCEPTED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, at xxi (Arthur T. Vanderbilt ed., 1949). 
 97. See COMM’N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO 
COURT ORGANIZATION (1974). 
 98. See 1 JUDICIAL ADMIN. DIV., ABA, STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: 
STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION (1990). 
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added standards for trial courts in 1992.99 The standards, developed by 
committees of state judges and court administrators, embrace the so-
called unified court approach, in which all courts in a state are under 
the administrative and rulemaking authority of the chief justice of the 
highest state court.100 The highest court of the state may be roughly 
analogous to the chief IJs within the EOIR. The revised standards 
recognize as well the need for strong and collegial local leadership.101 
The ABA has promulgated additional standards in various relevant 
areas, as have other groups. Professor Stacy Caplow referenced some 
of these standards—for example, the ABA Standards for State 
Judicial Selection—in her analysis of immigration courts.102 The 
Arnold & Porter February 2010 report on immigration courts for the 
ABA Commission on Immigration proposes performance reviews for 
IJs based on ABA and Institute for the Advancement of the 
American Legal System guidelines, along with a consolidated code of 
conduct adapted from the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct.103 
2. Court Performance Standards.  In 1990, partly in reaction to 
the ABA judicial administration standards, the National Center for 
State Courts published its Trial Court Performance Standards.104 
These performance standards, part of a national emphasis on 
organizational performance measures,105 reflect the view that even 
though the judicial administration standards state a well-informed 
conventional wisdom about how to organize and manage courts, what 
is ultimately important is how courts perform—whether they deliver 
justice fairly and expeditiously, for example, and use taxpayer funds 
responsibly. 
The National Center’s standards in five performance areas are 
aspirational statements of how litigants, other court users, and 
 
 99. See 2 JUDICIAL ADMIN. DIV., ABA, STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: 
STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL COURTS (1992). 
 100. 1 JUDICIAL ADMIN. DIV., supra note 98, at 3–4. 
 101. See id. at 3–5 (“All judges throughout the system should have a voice in 
policymaking . . . .”). 
 102. Caplow, supra note 88, at 99 & n.54. 
 103. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 92, at ES-29. 
 104. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, TRIAL COURT PERFORMANCE STANDARDS (2010), 
http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/TCPS/index.html. 
 105. See Richard Y. Schauffler, Judicial Accountability in the US State Courts: Measuring 
Court Performance, 3 UTRECHT L. REV. 112, 113, 118–19 (2007) (explaining the political 
context surrounding the push toward performance measurement in state courts). 
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taxpayers expect courts to perform.106 Table 2 provides some 
examples: 
Table 2.  Trial Court Performance Standards 
Performance Area Sample Standard 
1. Access to Justice 1.4 Courtesy, Responsiveness, and Respect—
Judges and other trial court personnel are 
courteous and responsive to the public, and 
accord respect to all with whom they come 
into contact. 
2. Expedition and 
Timeliness 
2.1 Case Processing—The trial court 
establishes and complies with recognized 
guidelines for timely case processing while, at 
the same time, keeping current with its 
incoming caseload. 
3. Equality, Fairness, and 
Integrity 
3.4 Clarity—The trial court renders decisions 
that unambiguously address the issues 
presented to it and clearly indicate how 
compliance will be achieved. 
4. Independence and 
Accountability 
4.5 Responses to Change—The trial court 
anticipates new conditions and adjusts its 
operations as necessary. 
5. Public Trust and 
Confidence (noting that 
courts have several 
constituencies107) 
5.3 Judicial Independence and 
Accountability—The public perceives the 
trial court as independent, not unduly 
influenced by other components of 
government, and accountable. 
These standards were released with a set of instruments for 
measuring court performance; however, these instruments were so 
intimidating that the National Center published in 2005 a simplified 
set of “CourTools”—ten core measures of court performance. These 
measures include: “Access and Fairness,” “Clearance Rates,” “Time 
to Disposition,” “Age of Active Pending Caseload,” “Trial Date 
Certainty,” “Reliability and Integrity of Case Files,” “Court 
 
 106. NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 104, at Preface. 
 107. Courts’ constituencies include “the vast majority of citizens and taxpayers who seldom 
experience the courts directly,” “opinion leaders,” “citizens who appear before the court,” 
judges and court employees, and lawyers “who may have an ‘inside’ perspective on how well the 
court is performing.” Id. at Performance Area 5. 
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Employee Satisfaction,” and “Cost per Case.”108 Partly in response to 
a 2005 Conference of State Court Administrators call for state courts 
to implement performance measures,109 individual courts and entire 
state court systems have started to use the CourTools, often placing 
the resulting scores on their public websites.110 
3. Court Culture.  Performance standards help judges and court 
managers identify how courts should perform and how to measure 
whether courts are performing as they should, but they offer little 
guidance about how to manage courts to achieve high performance. 
This realization led to a third effort to improve state courts—analysis 
of their cultures and a search for links between culture and 
performance, with the goal of shifting current cultures toward those 
associated with high performance. 
The 2007 pathbreaking work in this area, Trial Courts as 
Organizations,111 adapted analytical tools for assessing corporate 
culture and put them to use in twelve trial courts in three states. Brian 
Ostrom and his colleagues explained that “[a] court’s management 
culture is reflected in what is valued, the norms and expectations, the 
leadership style, the communication patterns, the procedures and 
routines, and the definition of success that makes the court unique. 
More simply: ‘the way things get done around here.’”112 
Based on a national survey of some seventy court experts, they 
identified four court “cultural archetypes”113—”communal” (which 
prizes “collegial decision-making”),114 “networked” (which 
emphasizes “creativity and innovation”),115 “autonomous” (which 
embodies a “judicial preference for limited administrative 
 
 108. The remaining two measures—“Collection of Monetary Penalties” and “Effective Use 
of Jurors”—have no applicability to immigration courts. See Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, 
CourTools, http://courtools.org (last visited Mar. 28, 2010). 
 109. Schauffler, supra note 105, at 121. 
 110. For evidence of the use of CourTools, see the site links for “State/County Specific,” 
Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Performance Measurement Resource Guide, http://www.ncsconline. 
org/WC/CourTopics/ResourceGuide.asp?topic=CtPerS#639 (last visited Mar. 20, 2010), and see 
also, for example, Utah State Courts, Utah Court Performance Measures, http://www.utcourts. 
gov/courtools/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2010). 
 111. BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., TRIAL COURTS AS ORGANIZATIONS (2007). 
 112. Id. at 4–5. 
 113. Id. at 36–38, 68–69. For a graphical summary of the attributes that Ostrom and his 
colleagues associate with these archetypes, see id. at 40 tbl.2-3. 
 114. Id. at 69 (emphasis omitted). 
 115. Id. at 74 (emphasis omitted). 
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controls”),116 and “hierarchical” (in which “the chain of command is 
clear”).117 They recognized that none of the archetypes would be 
perfectly or exclusively represented in any court; “court culture is a 
matter of emphasis and degree rather than perfect alignment.”118 To 
determine each of the twelve courts’ primary cultural type and its 
strength in the five performance areas, they fashioned a “Court 
Culture Assessment Instrument”119 and administered it to judges with 
a criminal docket and to senior court administrators.120 
Ostrom and his colleagues assessed the “performance 
consequences”121 of each court’s primary culture in several of the Trial 
Court Performance Standards areas. In terms of time to disposition, 
they expected and found that hierarchical courts are more likely than 
others to meet the ABA’s 1987 time standards for criminal felony 
clearance rates.122 As for the standards of access, fairness, and 
managerial effectiveness—“values [that] involve the rights and 
concerns of participants in the trial process other than judges and 
administrators”123—they surveyed attorneys who practiced in the 
twelve courts and found mixed results. Generally, though, both 
prosecutors and defense attorneys articulated the belief that courts 
with autonomous cultures have “a greater degree of access, fairness, 
and managerial effectiveness” than courts with hierarchical cultures,124 
because “[a]ttorneys will see themselves as . . . having greater 
access[ and] being treated more fairly, and courts acting more 
effectively in cultures where the attorneys have a greater say in how 
business is conducted.”125 
Ostrom and his colleagues asked judges and administrators 
which cultures they preferred—that is, in what ways they might want 
their courts to do business differently. They expected and found, as to 
managing cases and dealing with change, that judges and 
administrators generally preferred the aspects of hierarchical 
culture—doing business “on the basis of clear and orderly rules, 
 
 116. Id. at 79 (emphasis omitted). 
 117. Id. at 84 (emphasis omitted). 
 118. Id. at 42. 
 119. Id. at 47. 
 120. Id. at 47–57. 
 121. Id. at 91. 
 122. Id. at 94. 
 123. Id. at 99. 
 124. Id. at 108. 
 125. Id. at 108–09. 
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expertise, and modern management techniques.”126 As to judge-staff 
relations and internal organizations, they found a preference for 
networked cultures, in which business is done “on the basis of 
inclusiveness. . . . [b]ecause judges and court administrators have 
ongoing relationships and must consult each other to discuss ways to 
implement policies, allocate resources, . . . configure court staff,” and 
avoid “personnel conflicts.”127 For court leadership, they found that 
judges and administrators favored a communal culture—doing court 
business on a “collegial basis, where trust and mutual respect reign 
axiomatically.”128 Finally, they found little interest in an autonomous 
court culture. 
C. Applying Standards and Assessing Cultures in Immigration Courts 
From Trial Courts as Organizations and similar assessments 
emerge several observations about the culture-performance link that 
may be applicable to immigration courts. I hope to develop a broader 
framework for analysis and a research method to determine whether 
lessons learned about the organization and performance of third 
branch courts might be used beneficially in and by immigration 
courts. In this Section, I identify, as examples, two essential lessons 
that emerge from the analysis of third branch courts—chief judge 
leadership and measuring judicial performance. The “International 
Framework for Court Excellence,” developed by a consortium 
including members of the National Center for State Courts, several 
international and foreign court organizations, and the Federal 
Judicial Center, seeks to promote high performance in seven 
performance areas: court management and leadership; court policies; 
human, material, and financial resources; court proceedings; client 
needs and satisfaction; affordable and accessible court services; and 
public trust and confidence.129 The consortium’s basic conclusion is: 
“To become an excellent court, proactive management and 
leadership are required at all levels, not only at the top, and 
performance targets have to be determined and attained. Well-
informed decision-making [about achieving high performance] 
 
 126. Id. at 112. 
 127. Id. at 112–13. 
 128. Id. 
 129. INT’L CONSORTIUM FOR COURT EXCELLENCE, INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
COURT EXCELLENCE 2, 4, 26 (2008), available at http://www.courtexcellence.com/pdf/IFCE-
Framework-v12.pdf. 
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requires sound measurement of key performance areas and reliable 
data.”130 
1. Chief Judge Leadership.  One observation of third branch 
courts involves the ways in which the chief judge in each multijudge 
court can enhance the court’s performance by establishing policies 
through collegial decisionmaking, monitoring performance, building 
and sustaining morale, and searching for alternative ways for the 
court and its judges to operate. This observation does not seem to 
have infiltrated the EOIR or its DOJ overseers; indeed, unlike third 
branch courts, multijudge immigration courts do not each have their 
own chief judge. 
The immigration courts currently have eight Assistant Chief IJs 
(ACIJs) who are each responsible for between four and eleven 
immigration courts, usually on a rough geographic basis.131 One has 
responsibility, for example, for the three courts in or near New York 
City and the court in Ulster.132 Another has responsibility for eleven 
courts in Arizona, California, Nevada, Virginia, and Maryland.133 
Seven of these eight ACIJs are residents in one of the courts under 
their purview,134 but that leaves thirty-eight of the forty-five 
multijudge courts without a chief judge as a member of the court. The 
jobs of these ACIJs seem highly taxing, and the ABA’s 2010 report 
recommends a significant increase in the number of ACIJs.135 
Instead of more ACIJs, though, the DOJ, the EOIR, and the 
immigration courts should consider the conventional third branch 
approach of a chief judge for every multijudge court, or at least for all 
immigration courts with three or more judges. As of December 2009, 
twenty-nine of the fifty-seven courts had three or more judges, and 
those courts accounted for almost 80 percent of the receipts and of 
completed proceedings in 2008.136 
 
 130. Id. at 11. 
 131. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, ACIJ Assignments: Dec. 2009, http://www.justice.gov/ 
eoir/sibpages/ACIJAssignments.htm#ACIJ (last visited Mar. 20, 2010) (listing the ACIJs and 
their court assignments). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Compare id. (listing ACIJ assignments) with EOIR, supra note 26 (listing immigration 
judges by court). 
 135. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 92, at ES-29. 
 136. See EOIR, supra note 5, at B3 tbl.1; EOIR, supra note 26. 
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As much as small numbers and geographic remoteness may limit 
the ACIJs’ effectiveness (and I have no knowledge of their 
effectiveness), there may also be limitations stemming from what 
appears to be the job description. On the EOIR website, immediately 
below the link to the ACIJs and their areas of responsibility, are links 
to directions for filing complaints about IJ conduct.137 Picking up on 
the “chief judge as supervisor” tone, the ABA Commission report 
lists its recommendations for more ACIJs in a section headed 
“Inadequate Supervision and Discipline,”138 and a recent TRAC 
report on implementation of the attorney general’s 2006 changes 
reflects the same orientation.139 
The emphasis on ACIJs as supervisors and discipliners reflects 
the well-publicized concern over abusive and intemperate behavior 
by some IJs—those Professor Legomsky calls the “bad apples.”140 Part 
of any chief judge’s job is dealing with judicial misconduct—by 
looking for its causes and seeking individual remedies, from 
counseling to public reprimands to reporting the judge to a 
disciplinary body. But dealing with bad apples is not a chief judge’s 
only function. 
Ostrom and his colleagues describe a different type of chief 
judge, focused less on supervising a group of bureaucrats and more on 
leading a group of professionals “by fostering agreement among 
members and staff of the court in a collegial manner” and 
“encourag[ing] other judges and staff to embrace one set of cultural 
orientations in case management style and change management and 
another set in judge-staff relations and internal organization.”141 This 
observation is hardly novel. Steven Flanders’s 1977 study of factors 
associated with successful court and case management in federal 
district courts attributed the characteristics observed in high 
performing courts largely to those courts’ chief judges and what he 
called their “exceptional personal skills,” as well as their ability to 
 
 137. EOIR, supra note 26. 
 138. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 92, at ES-29. 
 139. See TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, IMMIGRATION COURTS: 
STILL A TROUBLED INSTITUTION (2009), http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/210/ (detailing 
Government Accountability Office criticism of the attorney general’s ACIJ “[p]ilot [p]rogram 
[t]o [d]eploy [s]upervisors to [r]egional [o]ffices”). 
 140. Legomsky, supra note 2, at 1675. 
 141. OSTROM ET AL., supra note 111, at 127 (emphasis omitted). 
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forge compromises, deal effectively with procedural issues, and work 
hard.142 
The emphasis of the ABA judicial administration standards 
comports generally with Ostrom and his colleagues’ findings. For 
example, although the ABA recognizes the chief justice as the central 
authority of each state’s court system, it says that each trial court 
should have its own administration “so that it can manage its 
business.”143 In this scheme, the chief judge of each court assumes a 
key role, not only as “the locus of responsibility for internal 
management, coordination between units, and conduct of external 
relations,”144 but also to “[s]et an example in performance of judicial 
and administrative functions,” emphasizing the importance of “tact, 
the ability to listen, attention to the interests of others, and 
persuasiveness.”145 
I have no evidence to suggest whether the current ACIJs 
function in a similar manner. At least one IJ writing specifically about 
the problem of unrepresented aliens praises her ACIJ for 
encouraging the judges to seek ways to improve aliens’ legal 
representation, pro bono and otherwise.146 
But it is unlikely that the current ACIJ arrangement fosters—or, 
given the numbers, even permits—the kind of chief judge stewardship 
envisioned for third branch courts. 
2. Performance Measures.  The other principle that emerges is 
the importance of measuring performance. For the immigration 
courts, measurement should be done in more areas and with more 
precision than casually chronicling IJs’ growing backlogs and 
collecting (some admittedly horrific) anecdotes about some IJs’ 
irresponsible and discourteous behavior. “Excellent courts 
systematically measure the quality as well as the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the services they deliver,”147 and those services extend 
well beyond disposing of cases quickly to include, for example, the 
first of the CourTools core measures, “Access and Fairness.” Ostrom 
 
 142. STEVEN FLANDERS, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NO. FJC-R-77-6-1, CASE MANAGEMENT 
AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS 78 (1977). 
 143. 2 JUDICIAL ADMIN. DIV., supra note 99, at 29. 
 144. Id. at 17. 
 145. Id. at 44–46. 
 146. Noel Brennan, A View from the Immigration Bench, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 623, 627 
(2009). Judge Brennan is an IJ at the main immigration court in New York City. 
 147. INT’L CONSORTIUM FOR COURT EXCELLENCE, supra note 129, at 33. 
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and his colleagues similarly emphasize systematic rather than casual 
and anecdotal measurement, and they suggest that the chief judge 
follow up when a judge fails to comply with agreed-upon reporting 
protocols.148 
Performance measurement can be both court based, such as 
CourTools, and individual judge based, typically, judicial 
performance evaluation (JPE), and can serve various purposes. 
Courts use CourTools as a management assessment device and to be 
accountable and transparent to court users and resource providers. 
“JPE” is a shorthand term of art that refers to a particular approach 
to measuring aspects of a judge’s performance. Various forms of JPE, 
which first appeared in the 1970s149 and was the subject of 1985 ABA 
standards,150 are in use, typically by statute or court rule, in at least 
nineteen states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.151 
Independent commissions use surveys and interviews of those who 
interact with the judge, case management data, and the judge’s work 
product to evaluate a judge on a regular schedule in the performance 
areas of legal knowledge, integrity and impartiality, communication 
skills, judicial temperament, and administrative skills.152 These 
evaluations serve various purposes: to assess the need for judicial 
education; to provide judges with objective information about their 
strong and weak points; and, in some states, to assist voters or others 
who decide whether to retain judges in office.153 Performance 
evaluation supporters insist that judicial discipline is not a purpose of 
JPE and warn against disseminating a judge’s JPE information to 
judicial disciplinary bodies.154 
 
 148. OSTROM ET AL., supra note 111, at 145. 
 149. Rebecca Kourlis & Jordan Singer, A Performance Evaluation Program for the Federal 
Judiciary, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 7, 10 n.9 (2008). 
 150. See SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE, ABA, 
GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE (1985). The Guidelines were 
reaffirmed in 2005. See ABA, BLACK LETTER GUIDELINES FOR THE EVALUATION OF 
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/jd/lawyersconf/pdf/jpec_ 
final.pdf. 
 151. Kourlis & Singer, supra note 149, at 9. 
 152. Id. at 10. 
 153. Id. at 9. 
 154. See ABA, supra note 150, at 1 (“Guideline 2-3. The uses of judicial performance 
evaluation do not include judicial discipline. The information developed in a judicial evaluation 
program should not be disseminated to authorities charged with disciplinary responsibility, 
unless required by law or by rules of professional conduct.”). 
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It bears emphasis that some of the DOJ administrative policies 
that most bother IJs are, in principle, integral components of high 
performing courts, including performance assessments and case-
processing standards. Professor Legomsky and others rightly ask 
whether the performance evaluations used for the immigration courts 
(and the BIA) stress productivity to the exclusion of other judicial 
virtues,155 and IJs cite what the National Association of Immigration 
Judges refers to as “a well-recognized and long-established principle 
that administrative law judges must be exempt from the provisions of 
agency administered performance evaluations . . . precisely to ensure 
their independence in decision-making.”156 
But the skewed emphasis that Professor Legomsky finds in the 
EOIR instruments, as well as their administration by executive 
branch supervisors, are not indictments of the concept of measuring 
judicial performance. They are indictments, rather, of how DOJ has 
implemented the concept. By analogy, JPE proponents see properly 
constructed and administered judicial performance evaluations as an 
antidote to interest groups that, in the post–Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White157 era, demand that judicial candidates complete 
questionnaires concerning their views on substantive legal matters.158 
3. Importing Third Branch Court Tools into Immigration Courts.  
I do not yet have a proposal for how a well-intentioned DOJ (or 
Professor Legomsky’s proposed freestanding Office of the Chief 
Administrative Law Judge for Immigration) can bring to immigration 
courts the staples of well-performing third branch courts, such as 
chief judges in each multijudge court or performance measures in the 
full range of court functions. The key considerations, though, are 
heavy involvement by the judges themselves and by independent, 
knowledgeable observers, as well as maintaining management 
oversight sufficient to provide accountability to Congress. And 
although the stunningly high per-judge caseloads may make it 
 
 155. See, e.g., Legomsky, supra note 2, at 128–29 n.123 (discussing the BIA’s emphasis on 
productivity). 
 156. Marks, supra note 9, at 14. 
 157. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788 (2002) (striking down, as 
violating the First Amendment, an ethics code that prohibited judicial candidates from 
announcing their views on disputed issues). 
 158. See, e.g., Terry Carter, The Big Bopper: This Terre Haute Lawyer Is Exploding the 
Canons of Judicial Campaign Ethics, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2006, at 30, 34 (2006) (discussing “the use 
of interest-group questionnaires being sent to judges up for retention or re-election and to their 
challengers”). 
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impractical to right the ship as opposed to constantly bailing it out, 
there may be room for trying new approaches in courts with per-
judge caseloads below the average. In 2008, fourteen immigration 
courts had less than nine hundred proceedings per judge—generally 
closer to the range that the ABA Immigration Commission report 
seemed to find acceptable in other administrative courts159—and these 
fourteen courts include nine courts with three or more judges.160 (Raw 
caseload numbers, however, may hide differences in case types and 
thus in the work required to dispose of different caseloads.) 
CONCLUSION 
Reinhold Niebuhr famously noted in 1944 that “democracy is a 
method of finding proximate solutions for insoluble problems.”161 The 
immigration adjudication system has proved to be an insoluble 
problem. It does not trivialize Niebuhr’s analysis of how to deal with 
profound social and political problems to envision, with respect to 
immigration adjudication, what he called “indeterminate creative 
ventures.”162 
 
 159. COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 92, at ES-28. 
 160. These calculations are based on the 224 judges listed on the EOIR website under 
Immigration Courts Nationwide and on receipt and other data reported in the EOIR 2008 
Statistical Year Book. See EOIR, supra note 5, at B2; EOIR, supra note 26. 
 161. REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS 
118 (1944). 
 162. Id. at 144. 
